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Abstract
The Porter Hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental
standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypoth-
esis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We show that times of adoption are
earlier the higher the non-adoption tax. The environmental tax turns the preemption
game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment yielding high profits
(pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the in-
troduction of a tax leads to lower profits (anti-Porter). An evaluation of the empirical
literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis holds even for profit-maximizing firms
under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competititon, X-inefficiency, and
agency costs. These are more likely to be present in sectors with large firms. In many
case studies that we evaluate, though, we detect an element of explicit or implicit sub-
sidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line with Pigovian policies.
Keywords: Environmental Policy, Strategic Trade Theory,
Technology Adoption, Porter Hypothesis
JEL: Q2, F1, H7, O3
1 Introduction
Competition among firms insures efficiency in competitive markets. Environmental reg-
ulation or taxation is usually seen as a nuisance to international competition, that will
lead to a distortion of competition. On the other hand many markets are imperfectly
competitive. Firms can have market power, or dynamic innovation effects disturb the
efficient production of goods. In combining the environmental regulation with the in-
novation effects and dynamic adoption or development of new production methods, the
environmental Porter Hypothesis suggests that the costs of compliance with environ-
mental standards may be offset by innovations they trigger (see Porter and van der
Linde, 1991, 1995a, 1995b). This may even lead to absolute advantages over foreign
competitors. In their (1995a) article (abbreviated as PL henceforth) they state:
“[W]e will argue that properly designed environmental standards can trig-
ger innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the costs of com-
plying with them. Such ‘innovation offsets,’ as we call them, can not only
lower the net cost of meeting environmental regulations, but can even lead
to absolute advantages over firms in foreign countries not subject to similar
regulations. Innovation offsets will be common because reducing pollution
is often coincident with improving the productivity with which resources are
used. In short, firms can actually benefit from properly crafted environmental
regulations that are more stringent (or are imposed earlier) than those faced
by their competitors in other countries. By stimulating innovation, strict
environmental regulations can actually enhance competitiveness.” (1995a,
p.98)
Since the general fear of trade economists was one of ecological dumping rather than
increased environmental regulation to improve competitiveness, the article was greeted
with skepticism. Nevertheless, it led economists to think seriously about the gist of
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the Porter Hypothesis: Is it possible that firms could gain advantage over their foreign
rivals through tougher environmental regulation? While classical trade theory offers no
reason to believe in the Porter Hypothesis, imperfect competition models were considered
promising to find some theoretical foundations to the case study and anecdotal evidence
offered by Porter and van der Linde.
The contribution of this paper lies in our approach to model the Porter Hypothesis as
well as an interpretation of the empirical literature. We will argue that it is inherent to
the Porter hypothesis to explicitly model the timing choice of both the home and foreign
firm’s technology adoption It is the timing of adoption of new technology combined with
international differences in the regulation that are at the core of the Porter Hypothesis
as it was originally formulated. The timing of adoption aspect of the Porter Hypothesis
has not been captured in formal theory so far. In this paper we adapt the model of
technology adoption of Reinganum (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, 1987) for this
purpose. The model allows for endogenous technology adoption timing in a model of
imperfect competition.
One point we want to make is that environmental policy may destroy a non-adoption
equilibrium. It may be rational not to adopt, although no opportunities are overlooked.
In a static game of technology adoption (Tirole 1988, Chapter 10) with environmental
taxation it can be shown that a sufficiently high environmental tax can force firms
out of a non-adoption equilibrium. However, this falls short of the Porter Hypothesis
which implies a ‘competitive’ advantage for the nation that introduces the environmental
regulation. In the static environment, the increased competitiveness cannot be reached.
If one country introduces environmental regulation that forces the ‘home’ firm out of a
static non-adoption equilibrium, the other firm would follow immediately.
In section 2, we introduce a dynamic model of a game of timing with a case of small
environmental taxes turning a preemption game into one of precommitment. We extend
this to the international case, therefore, providing a model of the Porter Hypothesis.
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We can show that the introduction of a small environmental tax can turn the dynamic
game of timing from a preemption game towards one of pre-commitment in which the
regulated firm is sure to have the technological lead. Thus, the Porter Hypothesis can
be confirmed in the sense that the introduction of a small tax ensures that the home
firm would win a preemption game with certainty. This establishes an order of adoption
and therefore a precommitment situation which yields higher profits for home than in
the preemption game, which would have taken place without the tax. In section 3 we
consider issues of optimal timing.
We do not follow PL in emphasizing incomplete information, organizational inertia
and control problems in the theoretical part of our paper. Rather, we emphasize that
all of their examples contain clear elements of implicit subsidies for adoption, which
are equivalent to taxes on non-adoption in our model. We do not deny the role of
the imperfections, but the logic is also compelling without them. In an evaluation of
the empirical and theoretical literature in section 4 we will show that both types of
arguments seem to be relevant: (i) X-inefficiency and agency costs such as managerial
time, alertness and information, and (ii) strategic interactions in imperfectly competitive
markets. Both are likely to be more relevant for large firms. The theoretical models
trying to rationalize the Porter hypothesis clearly show that in their interpretation the
Porter hypothesis does not contradict the profit-maximization paradigm but rather is in
accordance with it under multiple market imperfections (Ambec and Barla 2005).
1.1 Earlier Literature
Ulph (1996a) constructs a Brander-Spencer type of strategic trade model with Cournot
competition. Firms can invest in technology affecting variable costs but not the accom-
panying pollution. He shows that the strategic interaction between producers reduces
the government’s incentive to loosen environmental regulation. He concludes, though,
that the reduction of pollution with the lowering of the variable costs could change that
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result. This is the avenue that Simpson and Bradford III (1996) pick up. They model
the firms in a similar fashion, with the exception that R&D not only lowers marginal
costs, but also the emission of the pollutant. The government uses eﬄuent taxation to
maximize the domestics firm’s profits net of the environmental externalities of produc-
tion. The government is able to force the firm into a Stackelberg-leader position relative
to its foreign competitor. For some special cases of specifications and numerical param-
eter values they are able to construct a strengthening of regulation resulting in a shift
of profits from foreign to domestic firms. However, they stress that this is not a general
result and it is unlikely that environmental regulation should be used as a policy device
to induce industrial advantage. Greaker (2003) models the Porter Hypothesis by assum-
ing that due to the abatement technology the environment is an inferior input in the
production process. For some ranges of environmental taxation, this is shown to increase
competitiveness. However, the impact on profits remains ambiguous. Feess and Tais-
tra (2000) model a two-period game with Cournot competition. The environmentally
friendly technology is assumed to lead to a decrease of unit costs in the second period,
however not in a way that reduces overall costs. Policy agencies of the foreign nation are
assumed to stochastically imitate the national environmental regulation. Bertrand-type
imperfect competition models were introduced in the context of strategic environmental
trade policy in the paper by Barrett (1994). In the context of cost saving research Ulph
(1996b) shows both for environmental taxation and for environmental standards that
firms can benefit from tighter regulation if only the governments act strategically, but
firms do not.
Principal-agent models of the Porter Hypothesis are set in the context of organizational
inefficiencies. In this model type incentives between principal and agent over the choice of
projects are miss-aligned. Environmental regulation helps to re-align the preferences of
principal and agent, hence increases the efficiency of the firm (see for example Schmutzler
(2001) and Klein and Rothfels (1999)). Ambec and Barla (2006) show that, by reducing
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agency costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing innovation
while at the same time increasing firms’ private benefit.
Popp (2005) shows that under uncertain R&D, when firms underestimate the prof-
itability, environmental regulation may push them to do more profitable R&D. His sim-
ulations show that complete offsets occur frequently though not in a majority of cases.
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) and more Mohr (2002) use a general equilibrium
framework with a large number of agents, external economies of scale in production, and
discrete changes in technology. New technologies are modeled with an industry learning
curve, firms are initially stuck in a non-innovating equilibrium. Environmental regulation
enforces the adoption of ‘new technology’, hence allowing for subsequent learning.
Related to our paper is Hu¨bner (2001). Using a duopoly model of a patent races, which
are similar to our models of technology adoption, she shows that stricter environmental
policy might increase the probability of a sleeping patent instead of encouraging envi-
ronmental technological progress, but the reversed case is also possible: environmental
policy may activate otherwise sleeping patents.
Also, the paper of Osang and Nandy (2003) shows in a symmetric Cournot duoploy
model with pollution, firms can stick to high pollution production processes, or to low
pollution production processes, depending on the government regulation. Thus, for a
technology adoption process they show the adoption of new production processes as a
reaction to competitive pressures combined with government regulation.
Empirical support for the Hypothesis is based on case study evidence which will be
reviewed in the next subsection. There are, however, two general empirical attempts
to test parts of PL: Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995) provide empirical arguments
explaining why full offsets are rather unlikely. They base their argument on information
provided by entrepreneurs and find no direct evidence for the workings of the Porter
Hypothesis. A problem with both of these types of information provision is that the
costs of innovation precede the returns and the returns are often stretched out over
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decades. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) critically evaluate the Porter Hypothesis, they attempt
to empirically ‘test’ the Hypothesis, but find no evidence supporting it. This empirical
evaluation is based on the link between the stringency of environmental regulation and
R&D, but not on adoption.
2 Environmental taxes in a game of timing
In static models of technology adoption firms either both adopt or not at all even if only
one country raises a tax. Intermediate cases are not possible in this setting. However,
Reinganum (1981) and the extension by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) provide such a
model where firms either adopt earlier or later. We apply the model to the case of
environmental regulation in the spirit of the Porter Hypothesis. This allows to theoret-
ically evaluate the hypothesis, as we allow for dynamic effects which are crucial in the
argumentation leading towards an increased competitiveness.
Here we restate their model for the case of two firms and introduce an environmental
non-adoption tax, τ .1 We show that all possible modes of adoption — preemption,
following, and joint late adoption — are earlier the higher the adoption tax. Moreover,
an environmental tax ensures a precommitment position for the domestic firm. But it
decreases profits when increased further. A low environmental tax ensures a preemptive
position of the domestic firm, establishes an order of adoption, and therefore leads also
to a precommitment associated with higher profit, for the home firm.
Let pi0(0) - τ denote after-tax profits of a firm if no firm has yet adopted. pi0(1) - τ
denotes after-tax profits of a firm if only the other firm has adopted. pi1(1) is the profit
of a firm which has adopted but the other firm has not. pi1(2) is the profit of a firm if
both have adopted.2
1
τ could also be introduced by using country specific cost functions, however our purposes treating it
as a separate “cost” serves our purpose best.
2The number in brackets is the number of firms that has adopted: 0, 1, or 2. The subscript 1 (0)
indicates that a firm has (not) adopted.
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There is a cost c(t) associated with adoption. Early adoption of new technology is
more costly, hence c is a function of time such that early adoption is more costly (c′ < 0).3
Using superscript 2 for the firm that is second to adopt, the follower, and superscript 1
for the leader, the value of the firms with adoption times T1 and T2 can be written as
follows4:
V 1(T1, T2) =
∫ T1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt +
∫ T2
T1
pi1(1)e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T2
[pi1(2)]e
−rtdt− c(T1)
V 2(T2, T1) =
∫ T1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫ T2
T1
[pi0(1) − τ ]e
−rtdt +
∫
∞
T2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt− c(T2)
Firms differ only in two aspects. First, in the second phase, between T1 and T2, firm
1 has adopted and firm 2 has not. Second, the present value of the cost of adoption, c,
at different points in time are different, as c(T2) < c(T1) given assumption 4 below.
Assumptions made on the magnitude of the profit and cost items are the following:
1. There are decreasing returns in the rank of adoption: pi1(1) > pi1(2).
2. The difference in profits from adoption, at time zero, is not larger than the decrease
in the costs of adopting while waiting: pi1(1) − [pi0(1) − τ ] ≤ −c
′(0) for all τ ≥ 0.
Therefore immediate adoption is not profitable unless the equality part of the
equation holds.
3. Second adoption always becomes profitable after some time:
inft{c(t)e
rt} < {pi1(2)− [pi0(1)− τ ]}/r for all τ ≥ 0.
3The cost of adoption, c(t), is defined to be the present value of the cost of adopting the new technology
at time t.
4The first T on the left hand side denotes the firms own adoption time, the second the other firms
adoption time
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4. Current costs of adoption are falling but decreasingly so:
for all t, (c(t)ert)′ < 0, (c(t)ert)′′ > 0.
The decreasing returns in the rank of adoption assumption (1) only implies that adop-
tion is more profitable, if one is the only producer that has adoption.
No general claim is made here or by Porter and van der Linde that early adoption
or first moving is advantageous in general (see Hoppe 2002 for a survey of theory and
evidence), but the case studies, which support the Porter hypothesis are those of advan-
tageous early adoption. The ideas of Porter and van der Linde are clearly based on the
assumption of a first mover advantage (1995b, p. 124-129). Notice though that pi cap-
tures profits gross of adoption costs, whereas early adoption and first mover advantage
are derived on the basis of both gross profits and adoption costs, c, considered below.
Other outcomes are shown to be possible as well.
The second assumption merely excludes cases of immediate adoption. The third as-
sumption insures that the new technology is superior to the old one in the sense that it
can generate more profits once the cost of adoption have decreased sufficiently.5 Imme-
diate adoption is not relevant here, because under immediate adoption there would be
no room for regulations to speed up innovation (offsets), which are typical of the Porter
hypothesis.
Finally, the last assumptions gives a shape to the cost of adoption function. The
decreasing costs of adoption is straightforward.
The assumptions on the order of the profit terms as made are essential to having a
sequential adoption problem. They are satisfied in a linear Cournot model (Tirole 1988,
Hoppe 2002). Deriving them jointly with possible other outcomes would increase the
complexity very much.
5Stated differently, given both technologies without any cost of adoption the new technology would
always be preferred.
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It is obvious from assumptions (2) and (3) that taxes on non-adoption are equivalent
to subsidies for adoption. There are many examples for this type of taxes or subsidies
summarized in Table 4. The examples serve two purposes: they show that there is a lot
of emphasis on adoption in PL leading to innovation offsets and there are often implicit
or explicit taxes or subsidies involved.
2.1 Games of Timing: National Case
In the national case both firms are regulated by the same national policy, hence they
both operate under non-adoption tax. We will develop the optimal timing of adoption
in the case of a national competition first, i.e. where both firms are faced with the
same environmental regulation and taxation. In the next subsection (2.2) this will be
changed to the international case in which only the home firm faces an environmental
non-adoption tax. The derivations of the optimal timings of this section can be applied
to the international case by setting the the foreign firm’s tax equal to zero.
Precommitment allows a firm to commit to being either follower or leader. However
in order for precommitment to matter it has to be credible. We will argue below that
the environmental tax will eventually allow the firm to credibly precommit.6
Given credible precommitment on the order of adoption, the optimal adoption time
for the leader, T1, can be found from the first-order condition
dV 1/dT1 = [pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rT1 − pi1(1)e
−rT1 − c′(T1) = 0 (2.1)
The optimal adoption time for the follower in case of a precommitment can similarily
be found from the first-order condition
dV 2/dT2 = [pi0(1)− τ ]e
−rT2 − pi1(2)e
−rT2 − c′(T2) = 0. (2.2)
6See propositions 2.6 and 2.8.
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If the leader has already adopted, the second of the two equations determines the
followers optimal time, T ∗2 . Note that the equations determines the optimal timing for
the follower irrespective of the existence or absence of precommitment. Thus, it allows
us to calculate the impact of the environmental tax on the followers’ optimal adoption
time, by differentiating with respect to the level of environmental taxation τ :
dT ∗2
dτ
= −
−e−rT2
[pi0(1)− τ ](−r)e−rT2 + rpi1(2)e−rT2 − c′′(T2)
= −
−e−rT2
−rc′(T2)− c′′(T2)
< 0
(2.3)
The second part of the equation has been obtained by insertion of c′ from equa-
tion (2.2). Assumption (4) implies that the denominator, which is also the second-order
condition of equation (2.2), has a negative sign.
The dependence of timing of the leader upon the environmental tax can be derived in
a similar fashion:
dT ∗1
dτ
= −
−e−rT1
[pi0(0)− τ ](−r)e−rT1 + rpi1(1)e−rT1 − c′′(T1)
= −
−e−rT1
−rc′(T1)− c′′(T1)
< 0
(2.4)
This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 The leader and the follower adopt earlier under precommitment if the
environmental tax is larger.
This proposition, while it is not surprising, is an important one in the sense that the
tax affects both the leader and the follower by shortening the adoption time. Especially
the effect on the follower is often overlooked, while it leads to important changes: the
leader will have lower overall gains from leading if the follower adopts earlier. While
from the environmental point of view, the effect of regulation is improved (quickened)
adoption of the more environmental friendly technology by both types of firms.
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Note that the previous results were derived under the assumption that there is one
obvious leader and an obvious follower. This could be achieved by credible precommit-
ment. If, however, there is no precommitment on the order of adoption, preemption
might be a rational choice for firms. The timing of preemption can be found as follows.
The leader’s payoff if she succeeds in preempting at time t is
L(t) =


V (t, T ∗2 ) if t < T
∗
2
V (t, t) if t ≥ T ∗2
Where V (x, y) is the value of adopting at time t = x, given adopting of the other firm
at t = y. The followers payoff if he is preempted at time t is:
F (t) =


V (T ∗2 , t) if t < T
∗
2
V (t, t) if t ≥ T ∗2
If both firms adopt simultaneously the payoff for each firm is M(T ) = V (t, t).
If t < T ∗2 , L(t) > M(t) and F (t) > M(t).
The important issue here is to figure out how the timing of precommitment and
following are affected by environmental taxes. There are several issues here. First,
what is the optimal moment of adoption, given a firm wants to preempt (and similarily
given that one wants to follow), and secondly, what is the difference between leader
and follower payoff. Thus, subtracting the payoff of a follower from that of a leader,
an plugging in the equations (2.1) and (2.2) one finds that the first and second order
conditions of maximizing this difference are:
[L(t)− F (t)]′ = −pi1(1)e
−rT1 − c′(T1) + [pi0(1) − τ ]e
−rT1 = 0 (2.5)
[L(t)− F (t)]′′ = −rc′ − c′′ < 0 (2.6)
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because of assumption (4). As L(t) − F (t) has a maximum, each firm would like to
preempt the other. As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , L(0) < F (0) from assumption
(2) and L(T ∗2 ) = F (T
∗
2 ) from the definitions of L and F and L(T
∗
1 ) > F (T
∗
1 ) from
V 1(T ∗1 , T
∗
2 ) > V
2(T ∗2 , T
∗
1 ) under precommitment. Together with the monotonicity of the
value functions this information implies that there must be a point in time, T1, at which
L(T1) = F (T1) (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985, p. 386). This is the first profitable
point in time for preemption. Problematic in the model with preemption is that, given
symmetric firms, both would like to preempt at the same time or not at all.
Equating the values of the firms, V 1,2, for this point in time yields
L(T1)− F (T1) =
∫ T2
T1
pi1(1)e
−rtdt− c(T1)−
{∫ T2
T1
[pi0(1) − τ ]e
−rtdt − c(T2)
}
= 0 (2.7)
Proposition 2.2 Under preemption, the timing of preemptive adoption will be earlier
if the environmental tax is higher.
This follows from equation (2.7) which, differentiated with respect to the environmental
tax, implies:
dT1
dτ
= −
∫ T2
T1
e−rtdt
−pi1(1)e−rT1 + [pi0(1) − τ ]e−rT1 − c′(T1)
< 0.
Hence the timing of the preemptive point of time is pushed forward.
Now suppose that there is joint late adoption and therefore
M = V 1 = V 2. This is the case in which the point of preemption is not sufficiently
profitable, so that both firms wait. Insertion of the value functions given above for
T1 = T2 yields
M = V 1,2(T2, T1) =
∫ T1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt +
∫
∞
T2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt − c(T2)
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The optimal joint adoption time is found by maximization of M with respect to T =
T1 = T2. The first order condition is
dM
dT
= [pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rT − pi1(2)e
−rT − c′(T ) = 0
From this we can calculate the impact of an increase in the environmental tax on the
timing of joint adoption:
dT
dτ
= −
−e−rT
−r[pi0(0)− τ ]e−rT + rpi1(2)e−rT − c
′′(T )
< 0
Proposition 2.3 Joint late adoption takes place earlier under a higher environmental
tax.
We have shown that in all cases the environmental tax moves the timing of adoption
towards an earlier point in time. It is important to note that these results are to be
expected. In the next section the analysis will be extended to the case in which we have
unequal environmental taxes.
2.2 Games of Timing: International Case
Now let us suppose that the environmental regulation is one-sided. The firms are located
in different countries. Firm 1 is located in ‘Home’, while firm 2 is located in ‘Foreign’,
competing on a third market without transport costs or tariffs. Foreign does not intro-
duce any environmental regulation. Both the third market assumption and the fact that
Foreign does not introduce any environmental regulation are simplifying – but for the
ease of calculation necessary – assumptions. The first excludes in repercussions (on e.g.
welfare) of a competition in the home country that a government would be interested
in, while the second assumption of no foreign environmental tax is simply the extreme
case of having lower taxes.
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Table 1: Payoff in the game of timing
Foreign
lead follow
lead (Lh, Lf ) (Lh, F f )
Home
follow (F h, Lf ) (F h, F f )
Table 1 summarizes in general terms the payoff for the firms. Now pi0(0)− τ are after-
tax profits of the home firm and pi0(0) for the foreign firm if no firm has yet adopted.
pi0(1) − τ are after-tax profits of the home firm if only the other firm has adopted and
pi0(1) for the foreign firm. pi1(1) is the profit of the home firm which has adopted but
the other, foreign firm has not. pi1(2) is the profit of either firm if both have adopted.
We use superscript ‘h’ and ‘f ’ for home and foreign respectively.
As in the national case, let us first examine the case in which the home firm is pre-
committed to be the follower. In this case:
F h ≡ V hF (T
h
2 , T
f
1 ) =
∫ T f1
0
[pi0(0)−τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫ Th2
T
f
1
[pi0(1)−τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
Th2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt−c(T h2 )
(2.8)
And for the foreign, precommitted leader, we have:
Lf ≡ V fL (T
f
1 , T
h
2 ) =
∫ T f1
0
pi0(0)e
−rtdt+
∫ Th2
T
f
1
pi1(1)e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
Th2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt−c(T f1 ) (2.9)
Given that home follows, we can determine the optimal adoption time:
T h2 :
∂V hF
∂T h2
= [pi0(1) − τ ]e
−rTh2 − pi1(2)e
−rTh2 − c′(T h2 ) = 0 (2.10)
We can see that T h2 (r, τ) is independent of T1. Further,
∂Th2
∂τ
< 0. Hence we can state
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that:
Proposition 2.4 Home, as the follower, adopts earlier if the environmental tax is
larger, decreasing the time that a foreign firm can reap the benefits of early adoption.
Examining the impact of the environmental tax, τ , on the timing of the foreign leader
we find:
T f1 :
∂V fL
∂T f1
= pi0(0)e
−rT
f
1 − pi1(1)e
−rT
f
1 − c′(T f1 ) = 0 (2.11)
Hence, T f1 is independent of τ and T
H
2 . The timing of foreign leadership is not affected
by the tax τ imposed by the home government.
Let us now turn to the case in which home is precommitted leader and foreign is follower:
F f ≡ V fF (T
f
2 , T
h
1 ) =
∫ Th1
0
pi0(0)e
−rtdt+
∫ T f2
Th1
pi0(1)e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T
f
2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt− c(T f2 )
(2.12)
Lh ≡ V hL (T
h
1 , T
f
2 ) =
∫ Th1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫ T f2
T
h
1
pi1(1)e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T
f
2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt− c(T h1 )
(2.13)
Again, we can determine the optimal timing of T2, given that foreign is committed to
follow.
T f2 :
∂V fF
∂T f2
= pi0(1)e
−rT
f
2 − pi1(2)e
−rT
f
2 − c′(T f2 ) = 0 (2.14)
Once more, the timing of the foreign firm’s adoption, here T f2 , is independent of τ , but
also of the timing of early adoption T h1 . Further note that, T
H
2 < T
f
2 , because (2.10)
and (2.14) differ only by τ in (2.10).
For the timing of home, as the precommitted leader, we get:
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Figure 1: Timing of adoption under precommitment
T h1 :
∂V hL
∂T h1
= [pi0(0) − τ ]e
−rTh1 − pi1(1)e
−rTh1 − c′(T h1 ) = 0 (2.15)
Note that the time of adoption is earlier the higher the environmental tax:
∂Th1
∂τ
< 0.
Home, as a leader, adopts faster than foreign as a leader, i.e. T h1 < T
f
1 because of (2.11)
and (2.15).
Proposition 2.5 Foreign adopts slower — given that the environmental tax is smaller
or equal to zero — than the home firm both as leader and follower
Returns to Leadership and Following
We have shown above, that — under precommitment — home adopts earlier than the
foreign firm, both as a leader and as a follower. Hence, we can order all timing of
adoption in the following way: T h1 < T
f
1 < T
h
2 < T
f
2 , which is also depicted in Figure 1.
We have to make sure, though, that the firms actually want to be leader or follower.
In order to examine this we have to examine the difference between leadership returns
L and follower returns F . Table 2 summarizes the payoff, which will be specified below.
Home would like to lead if Lh−F h ≥ 0 and follow otherwise. Subtracting the maximized
value of (2.8) from (2.13) yields:
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Table 2: Preferences of the Firm
Foreign
lead follow
Lh − F h > 0, Lh − F h > 0,
lead Lf − F f > 0 Lf − F f < 0
Home
Lh − F h < 0, Lh − F h < 0,
follow Lf − F f > 0 Lf − F f < 0
L∗h − F ∗h =
∫ T ∗f1
T ∗h1 (τ)
[pi1(1)− pi0(0) + τ ]e
−rtdt +
∫ T ∗h2 (τ)
T
∗f
1
[pi1(1)− pi0(1) + τ ]e
−rtdt
+
∫ T ∗f2
T ∗h2 (τ)
[pi1(1) − pi1(2)]e
−rtdt−
[
c(T ∗h1 (τ))− c(T
∗h
2 (τ))
]
(2.16)
2.2.1 Preemption
Home will try to preempt as long as L∗h−F ∗h > 0 and being the leader at the preemption
time T yields at least the same revenue as being a follower. At this point the partial
differential of equation (2.7),i.e. the first profitable time of preemption with respect to
the height of the tax τ is evaluated:
∂T
h
1
∂τ




Lh(Th
1
)=F h(T∗h
2
)
= −
(1)
z }| {
−
Z Th
1
0
e
−rt
dt
(2)
z }| {
+
Z T
∗f
1
0
e
−rt
dt
(3)
z }| {
−[pi0(1)− τ ]e
−rT∗h
2
∂T
∗h
2
∂τ
(4)
z }| {
+
Z T∗h
2
T
∗f
1
e
−rt
dt
(5)
z }| {
+pi1(2)e
−rT∗h
2
∂T
∗h
2
∂τ
(6)
z }| {
+c
′ ∂T
∗h
2
∂τ
[pi0(0) − τ ]e−rT
h
1 − pi1(1)e−rT
h
1 − c′(T h1 )
The denominator is greater than zero as Lh − F h = 0 is before (in time) the maximum.
We will evaluate the sign of the numerator by the parts indicated with the brackets
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above them: The first part (1)
−
[
1
−r
e−rt
]Th1
0
= −
[
1
−r
e−rT
h
1 −
1
−r
]
< 0 as T h1 > 0
has the economic interpretation that the environmental tax reduces the profit of leader-
ship in the first phase, and therefore the first profitable time of adoption is later.
The second part (2) is greater than zero:
∫ T ∗f1
0
e−rtdt =
[
1
−r
e−rt
]T ∗f1
0
=
1
−r
[
e−rT
∗f
1 − 1
]
> 0 as T ∗1 > 0
The tax reduces the follower profit in the first phase, the company has an earlier first
profitable time of adoption.
The 3rd, 5th and 6th term are all zero, as the Envelope Theorem applies to F ∗h and
therefore
∂Th∗2
∂τ
-terms sum to zero and drop out.
The 4th term ensures that
∂Th1
∂τ
< 0, i.e. earlier pre-emption point of time for home
with higher environmental taxation. Hence, the taxation insures that the home firm
always accepts earlier preemption times than foreign, because taxes guarantee lower
profits as follower, and will thus win preemption games with certainty (rather than with
a 50 percent chance).
Proposition 2.6 A non-adoption tax in one country ensures that the firm in that coun-
try can preempt earlier than the firm in the other country. This establishes the order of
adoption and therefore the precommitment case becomes relevant, where the home firm
get higher profits than in the preemption game.
2.2.2 Joint late adoption
Another possibility is that both firms prefer to defer the investment in the new technol-
ogy, yielding a joint late adoption equilibrium: M(t) = V (t, t).
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The value function for foreign will then be:
Mf (t) =
∫ Tˆ1
0
pi0(0)e
−rtdt +
∫
∞
Tˆ1
pi1(2)e
−rtdt − c(t)
The value function for the home firm mirrors that of the foreign firm, with the inclusion
of the environmental tax for the non-adoption time.
Mh(t) =
∫ Tˆ1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt +
∫
∞
Tˆ1
pi1(2)e
−rtdt − c(t)
The first order conditions for c(t) are
∂Mf
∂Tˆ1
= pi0(0)e
−rTˆ1 − pi1(2)e
−rTˆ1 − c′(Tˆ1) = 0
= (pi0(0)− pi1(2))e
−rTˆ1 − c′(Tˆ1) = 0
∂Mh
∂Tˆ1
= (pi0(0) − τ − pi1(2))e
−rTˆ1 − c′(Tˆ1) = 0
This environmental tax destroys late adoption, as it leads to earlier adoption than
the foreign firm, hence destroying the joint late adoption equilibrium. If under some
circumstances joint late adoption was the equilibrium outcome among equal firms, it
will be destroyed by the environmental tax levied asymmetrically on the home firm.
Proposition 2.7 Even small taxes create a precommitment against (late) joint adop-
tion.
2.2.3 Returns to leadership
The change of ‘leadership returns’ with respect to the environmental tax, τ , for home
is evaluated below. Differentiation with respect to T h1 sum up to zero when the envelop
theorem is applied to Lh and those with respect to T h2 when it is applied to F
h. Therefore
only the direct effects matter.
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∂(Lh−Fh)
∂τ
=
∫ T f1
Th1 (τ)
e−rtdt +
∫ Th2 (τ)
T
f
1
e−rtdt
=
[
−1
r
e−rt
]T f1
Th1
+
[
−1
r
e−rt
]Th2
T
f
1
= − 1
r
[
e−rT
f
1 − e−rT
h
1
]
− 1
r
[
e−rT
h
2 − e−rT
f
1
]
= − 1
r
[
e−rT
h
1 − e−rT
h
2
]
> 0
A higher non-adoption tax increases the desire to lead, because it reduces profits from
followership, F h, more than from leadership, Lh. Similarly, the foreign firm would like
to lead if Lf − F f ≥ 0.
Lf − F f =
∫ T f1
Th1
[pi0(0) − pi0(1)]e
−rtdt+
∫ Th2
T
f
1
[pi1(1)− pi0(1)]e
−rtdt
+
∫ T f2
Th2
[pi1(2) − pi0(1)]e
−rtdt− [c(T f1 )− c(T
f
2 )]
(2.17)
Now the effect of the ‘home tax’ on foreigns willingness to lead (or follow), is captured
in the following derivative:
∂(Lf − F f )
∂τ
= −[pi0(0) − pi0(1)]e
−rTh1
∂T h1
∂τ
+ pi1(1)e
−rTh2
∂T h2
∂τ
− pi1(2)e
−rTh2
∂T h2
∂τ
We cannot fully sign the derivative.7 Therefore we give a numeric simulation in the next
subsection.
2.3 Simulations
The cost function in this numerical simulations will be parameterized as c(t) = 100·e−αt.
The assumption of c′ < 0 and c′′ > 0 are then fulfilled for all economically sensible
parameter values of α ∈ R+. The parameter α can be interpreted as one of technological
advancement lowering the cost of adoption over time.
We have parameterized the profits after innovation using an additional parameter x in-
7A large pi0(1) makes the desire to lead weaker, because it gives a higher weight to the timing shift
effect. But a larger pi2(1) has opposing effects directly and from equation (2.3).
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Figure 2: Timing of Technology Adoption under Pre-commitment
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dicating the increase in profits through the new technology, denoting long-run advantage
of the new technology. Note that this advantage is lasting even after the follower has also
adopted. For the different parameter values that we have tried, refer to Table 3.8 In case
3, we find the possibilities for preemption and precommitment. In the other case there is
no case of preemption because the short-run gain is too low. In the simulation that we will
discuss extensively in this section, case 3, we set the interest rate to be r = 0.04, and the
cost decrease of adopting the new technology over time to be α = 0.1. The returns gross
of adoption costs we assume are pi0(1) = 1.9, pi0(0) = 2,≤ pi1(2) = 2+x < pi1(1) = 3.1+x.
In words, being a follower decreases the profits by five percent, whereas the (temporary)
leader gains more than fifty percent in the short run plus some value x = pi1(2)− pi0(0)
gross of cost of adoption in the long run. This value of x remains after the follower
has caught up and also implemented the new technology. Setting x to zero thus would
indicate that — at least in terms of profits — no advantage of adoption would remain.
The timing of technology adoption can be calculated both for given (precommitted)
leadership and followership according to equations (2.10, 2.11, 2.14, and 2.15). Figure
2 plots the timing of adoption for various levels of x or y ≡ x+ τ for foreign and home
8The parameter values presented in the table give the most relevant variations for this simulation
exercise. We have tried other parameter values which confirm the results we present here.
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Table 3: Simulation Parameters and Results
Case pi0(1) pi0(0) pi1(2) pi1(1) α r z · c Result
1 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.2 0.04 100c precommit
2 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.1 0.04 200c precommit
3 1.9 2 2 + x 3.1 + x 0.1 0.04 100c preempt or precommit
4 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.1 0.04 100c precommit
respectively. The inner line plots the timing given a firm’s precommitment to leading,
the outer line gives the optimal time of adoption given precommitment to follow.
As this figure is based on precommitment, we have to show that firms actually want
to be leader or follower. If, for example, both firms would want to lead, a game of
preemption will occur in which earlier points of times are chosen than those given in
Figure 2. We will deal with preemption further below.
In Figure 3 we plot L− F values for both home and foreign (cf. Equations 2.16 and
2.17) for various levels of x and y ≡ x + τ . L − F is the profit from leading minus
profits from following, hence as long as it is positive, a firm will attempt to be the first
to adopt. The figure graphically illustrates this situation for the home and foreign firm.
The area in which the L−F area is above zero home would like to lead. Areas that are
overlapping between those two figures indicate regions of pre-emption. Note that x has
the interpretation as above, i.e. continued gain in profits through technology, while y is
defined as the sum of x+ τ . For the chosen parameter specification and cost functions,
the 45 degree line of x = y, i.e. no environmental tax, is an overlapping region in which
both home and foreign would like to lead. Hence, preemption would take place by each
firm with fifty percent chance (Fudenberg and Tirole 1987). However, for large τ > 0,
i.e. x < y = x+ τ we can see that both firms are pulled out of the preemption area and
home will be the leader (L − F is positive for the home firm) whereas foreign prefers
to follow (L− F is negative for the foreign firm). Only for small values of x and τ will
preemption take place.
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Figure 3: Willingness to lead: L− F
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Figure 4: Preemption Point of Time
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Proposition 2.8 If the short-term gain is large enough to allow for a preemption case,
low environmental taxes induce a preemption game which is certainly won by the home
firm. The foreign firm will not want to play it. The order of adoption being established,
there will be a precommitment outcome of the game. High non-adoption taxes induce a
precommitment for the home firm to be the leader directly.
In Figure 4 the “height” gives the first profitable time T of preemption. Note that
the points of time are decreasing for home with the y-axis while they are decreasing for
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foreign along the x-axis. Preemption should result with low τ and precommitment with
high environmental taxes τ . In the case of a preemption game, the lower x is (along the
45 degree line) and the higher τ (moving parallel to the y-axis), within the preemption
range, the later will be the first profitable point of preemption for the foreign firm. For
home, higher environmental taxes lead to earlier profitable points of preemption. Hence,
home will have an earlier profitable preemption point of time for any τ > 0, therefore, it
will preempt just before foreign’s first profitable point of preemption (which yields higher
profits than home’s first profitable point, and is sufficient to be the first one to preempt).
We can then calculate the profits of preemption as a function of x and τ . Increasing τ
leads to lower preemption profits. Figure 5 summarizes the profits of home as a function
of x and y = x + τ . The left figure gives the profits as a function of x and y = x + τ .
Profits are increasing along the 45 degree line and an increase in τ will lower the profits
of the firm. This implies that environmental taxation does not lead to higher profits
of the firms in games of preemption. The right part of Figure 5 gives the profits under
precommitment: For small values of x (and τ) an increase in environmental taxation
will lead to lower profits. Under high levels this is reversed. Only in this last case, the
Porter Hypothesis would be supported. However, these high values of y imply negative
adoption times and therefore have to be excluded, which one can show by cutting off
the graph at the value of y at which there is immediate adoption.
Proposition 2.9 Profits under preemption are lower the larger the non-adoption tax
and profits under precommitment are lower for higher taxes.
For all other numerical values which do not violate the assumptions of the model we
found results that are qualitatively identical.
We have shown in this last section that environmental regulation can be beneficial in
the strategic games of timing, to allow the home firm to lead and avoid preemption.
One should bear in mind that this numerical example was contrived and is specific to
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Figure 5: Home’s Profits for Preemption and Precommitment
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the parameter values at hand. Many other scenarios can be thought of which might be
just as compelling. Nevertheless, we have shown that environmental tax allows for a
quicker adoption, and a longer time of ‘leadership’ under precommitment and a shorter
time of followership in general. Profits of the firm, however, are not higher: Higher
taxes decrease the profits in the first phase of (3.13), induce a longer second phase (T f2
is unaffected by τ) and a shorter first phase and higher adoption costs. The net effect is
negative.
Corollary 2.10 In case of precommitment under no environmental tax, the introduction
of a tax decreases profits (anti-Porter). In case of a preemption game under no environ-
mental tax, the introduction of a small tax allows the home firm to win the preemption
game, and thus establishes an order of adoption. This leads to a precommitment case
which assures higher profits of the home firm compared to the preemption game (pro-
Porter).
In essence we have constructed an example of the weak version of the Porter Hypoth-
esis, as firms – maximizing their profits – are pulled out of an equal chance preemption
equilibrium in such a way that the firm constrained by the environmental regulation
adopts earlier with certainty. Competitiveness in the sense of winning a preemption
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game is enhanced. Non-environmental as well as environmental welfare is enhanced for
consumers of home, as they get higher quality and cleaner products earlier.
3 Optimal timing
In order to obtain a welfare function we can enhance the profit functions (2.8), (2.9),
(2.12), (2.13) by adding an environmental damage function, −D, consumer benefits, S,
and tax revenues. Tax revenues and payments then drop out. In the simplest case of a
process innovation with no change in consumer benefits we then only have to add the
environmental damage function. Assuming, again for simplicity, that pollution is only
national, then a simple assumption for a damage function is
Dji =
∫ T ji
0
d0e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T
j
i
d1e
−rtdt with i = 1, 2 , j = h, f
depending on whether the country is the home or the foreign country and is adopting
first or second. d0 is the environmental damage per period before adoption and d1 after
the adoption. When taking the time derivatives this will augment the functions (2.10),
(2.11), (2.14), (2.15) (without tax term) by the term
−(d0e
−rT
j
i − d1e
−rT
j
i )
This term appears where taxes appeared before and have dropped out when canceled
against the revenue term. By implication the old and the new equations are the same
in the special case where
τ = d0 − d1 > 0
In this case the tax would be a Pigouvian policy instrument, not taking into account
strategic interactions between firms or governments. The effect of taking into account
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damages then is the same as that of taxes as analyzed above: all adoption times are
earlier than without taking into account taxes or damages respectively. In the Cournot
literature cited above the tax was reduced in the second stage game between govern-
ments because of the strategic interactions. We do not carry out such a second stage
game because it is tractable only in a numerical way anyway and probably not some-
thing that governments can reasonably be expected to do for every adoption problem.
We did show above that a small tax by one government only may be enough to move
the preemption position from a 50/50 chance to one of zero to the home firm. However,
if the tax is increased further profits fall. On the other hand, a higher tax generates an
earlier first-profitable time of adoption and therefore a strategic advantage in a second
stage game. This might give an incentive for governments to put their value above the
Pigouvian one. If both governments decide to have the same tax in a symmetric game,
there is no impact on the first profitable time of adoption. Home must have a slightly
larger tax than foreign, other things equal. The foreign tax can be normalized to unity.
Therefore we concentrated on Porter’s case of a one-sided tax. Our analysis as presented
above, however, is not limited to a Pigouvian tax, but rather can have any value.
Extending the welfare function for consumer benefits in case of delivery to third mar-
kets only is slightly more complicated. It would imply, in one of the possible models
we could imagine, considering international welfare and therefore the sum of the profit
functions for home and foreign. Consumer benefits then are increased twice, first, when
the first firm adopts and offers a better quality probably at a higher price and, second,
when the second firm adopts and price competition decreases the price of the better
variant. The formal treatment then requires adding consumer benefits
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Sji =
∫ T j1
0
s0e
−rtdt+
∫ T j2
T
j
1
s1e
−rtdt +
∫
∞
T
j
2
s2e
−rtdt with j = h, f
to the sum of (2.8) and (2.10) or that of (2.12) and (2.13) using the adequate j, h or f ,
after adding the environmental damage function and dropping the tax terms as above.
We leave the exploration of details to the interested reader, noting that it is an interna-
tional optimum now, obtained as an enhanced joint profit-maximization problem. It can
serve only as a benchmark but not as a recommendation for any international institution,
because there is no one deciding on technology adoption or caring for consumer benefits
in the sense of this model. A second model we could imagine would be one where welfare
is defined as national profits plus benefits of customers abroad. Then a consumer benefit
function could be written down that is completely symmetric to the damage function
above. The tax term τ would then be replaced by d0 − d1 − (s0 − s1) > d0 − d1 in the
conditions for optimal timing and the marginal consumer benefit would do the same as
a tax or the marginal damage, that is inducing earlier adoption times.9
4 Tests of the Porter Hypothesis: A theory guided
interpretation
4.1 Empirical methods and reformulations of the hypothesis
The essence of the Porter hypothesis is that static calculations of the cost of environmen-
tal regulation ignore innovation. If the latter is taken into account costs are lower and
in some cases profits are even enhanced. Based on this, one would expect that analyses,
which take into account innovation and have a long-run perspective should give more
9A complication arises here if a customer switches to the foreign competitor after adoption of the home
firm. It is reasonable to assume that this does not decrease the total benefit of the consumers of the
home firm.
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lower cost estimates than the static ones or those that ignore technical change. However,
what the adequate formulation of the hypothesis is, depends also on the methods, which
empirical studies use. PL use case studies whereas others use regression analysis, often
in combination distance functions approaches.
As Porter and van der Linde base their arguments on case studies it is worth empha-
sizing that they only claim that ‘In some cases, these “innovation offsets” can exceed the
cost of compliance.’ (PL, 1995a, 101). This is a fairly weak claim. Stronger formula-
tions, which are cited by some authors go always accompanied by multiple qualifications
of PL, which are sometimes underreported by the authors. What was later called a ‘weak
version’ of the hypothesis differs in its definition from paper to paper. This is also due to
differences in emphasis on competitiveness, profits, factor productivity and productive
efficiency either in all markets or in just environmental goods. This requires sophisti-
cation going beyond the question whether the Porter hypothesis is right or wrong and
rather tackling the more sophisticated issue under which conditions and circumstances it
is right or wrong. With case study methods — which may be quite a bit more than just
anecdotic evidence — it is straight forward to expect differentiations as to the question,
under which conditions the hypothesis holds. In regression analysis one typically looks
at the sign and significance of a coefficient. Here we can get more detailed information
when comparing for which samples the Porter hypothesis holds and where it does not.
In particular, the question from the perspective of economic theory as discussed above
is for each data set, whether or not it consists of firms or other units for which one can
expect perfect efficiency as in the neoclassical first-principles view, or, alternatively, to
have the agency costs, X-inefficiencies and managerial slackness emphasized by PL and
others or the strategic problems emphasized by the industrial organization literature.
Only in the latter two cases can we have innovation offsets either for environmental
goods or for all goods and firm performance criteria such as (current) profits, productiv-
ity changes, productive efficiency or competitiveness. We will look at this question for
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all investigations, which have been made with explicit reference to the Porter hypothesis
either in the title or in the abstract.10
4.2 Case studies
There are many case studies that deal with the effect of environmental regulation or
taxation on the adaption of new production process, both with and without explicit ref-
erence to the Porter Hypothesis. We concentrate on the latter cases, without pretending
that this overview is exhaustive, rather is should serve as a means to compare them to
the theoretical results of the previous section.11
Ayres (1994) describes some cases in the utilities and the chemical industry. In par-
ticular, Ayres’ case study of ‘Dow Chemicals’ shows that for decennia the firm has made
investment plans irrespective of environmental considerations and then has sent an en-
vironmental task force to check for environmental gains, which could yield gains from
this second stage for decennia. This is clearly a case of adoption of environmental tech-
nologies of the retrofitting type. Adoption can result in an advantage, but of course only
as long as competitors do not do the same thing. Putting then more pressure through
environmental policy to do this earlier induces a competitive advantage if done in one
country only.
In the Green light program of the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), now
called Energy Star, participating firms obtained an advice on efficient lighting, heating
and cooling operations for free from the USEPA. Besides the awareness effect this free
advice is an implicit subsidy. The measures taken according to such advice had pay
back times below two years. Obviously, a firm has an advantage vis-a`-vis a competitor
10This implies that we do not look again at some papers of the older literature, which has been made
independently of but published during the same years as the PL papers and tackled the Porter
hypothesis only as a side remark. Exceptions are papers, which are held to be relevant by several other
papers selected (from the Journal of Economic Literature and the literature database ‘econpapers’)
in the above mentioned manner. Ambec and Barla (2006), by virtue of writing earlier, consider less
recent literature, more old literature, emphasize the energy sector and econometric methods and by
implication ignore case studies.
11See also Ambec and Lanoie (2007) for an overview of related papers.
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only as long as the competitors have not participated as well and obtained a similar
free advice (Porter and van der Linde 1995a, p. 99). As far as foreign competitors are
concerned, Sweden and the UK followed the USA and so did the EU in 2000.12 In the
meanwhile Americans saved 12 billion in 2005, of which 1.2 billions saved by industry
(EPA, 2006, Table 1)13 provided a competitive advantage.
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs provided EUR 425 million for subsidies for
investments of firms supporting a CO2-reduction plan during the years 1997-2002. A
similar program was carried out by the Dutch Ministry of Traffic and Infrastructure in
2002-2005 for investments in the transport of goods and persons supporting a volume of
EUR 40 million additional investments, compared to a business as usual scenario, with
a subsidy of EUR 9.1 million buying 160,000 ton CO2 reduction per year to be realized
by 2010 for EUR 10 per ton. For 2006-2007 a similar program will be carried out with
EUR 6 million in subsidies. Again it is obvious that a competitive advantage can be
obtained by a firm only as long as domestic competitors do not use the program and
foreign competitors cannot use a similar program of their own government.14
When the Montreal Protocol and the US Clean Air act forbid the use of CFCs the
firm Raytheon adopted a semi-aqueous terpene-based cleaning agent that had both, a
better product quality and lower operating costs. Without mandating the drop of CFCs
this would not have been achieved (PL 1995a, 101). As there was an almost costless
alternative no tax or subsidy was necessary. However, there was a tax on ozone depleting
materials with an exception for HCFCs replacing the CFCs. This was to the advantage
of DuPont, the major producer of HCFCs and its clients (Albrecht 1998a,b).
When a US City threatened to close a jewelry firm (Robbins) because of toxic water
pollution, the new system adopted produced better water quality, which also led to a
better product quality in plating and thus higher competitiveness (PL, 1995a, 102). The
12IAEEL newsletter 1/99
13Energy Star And Other Climate Protection Partnerships, 2005 Annual Report
14SenterNovem , Projectenboek CO2-reductieplan, October 2005. Similar forerunner programs have
been discussed by Steger et al. (2004), section 7.3.1
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Table 4: Examples
Example Institution Tax or subsidy equivalent
Green light program USEPA free advice available to all
competitors (Energy Stars)
CO2 reduction plan Dutch Ministries Subsidy via tax deduction
CFC, Raytheon Montreal Protocol Tax break on HCFCs US
Clean Air Act
Ciba-Geigy Standards Standards are almost tax
equivalent wastewater
Robbins Citys threat of closure; Threat is similar to non-
adoption tax Toxic water
pollution
Hitachi, Waste Japanese recycling law; law is similar to tax equva-
lent
German Laws on CHP and
renewable energy
Subsidy on market price in
specified in fixed
threat is similar to a non -adoption tax, but of course more drastic.
Ciba-Geigy reconsidered its wastewater streams because of new standards and reacted
by reduction of iron components in a diet increasing yields by 40% and reduction of toxic
releases into the wastewater resulting in cost savings of 740 thousand (PL, 1995a, 102).
Again, standards are similar to non-adoption taxes in that they impose costs, but are of
course different in other respects.15
In the second case of Table 4 there is an explicit subsidy. In the first there is a freely
available service. Subsidies contain two elements: a pressure and a gain. In the other
cases there are standards, laws or threats, which combine the elements of pressure and
an innovation offset, either in the product or in the process of production. PL provide
more cases of pressure from standards and laws with innovation offsets. Not in all cases
do we get the full information to check for profitability. However, it is mostly evident
that consumers benefit and firms react only after some pressure, and in ‘some cases’ (PL,
15Many other examples can be found in PL (1995a and 1995b), in particular on page 123 and IAEL
(1999).
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1995a, p. 101) the firm gets more profits. What is essential for our model is the similarity
of pressure from laws and standards with innovation offsets with the subsidy for adoption
or a tax for non-adoption. Moreover, all examples relate to non-immediate adoption,
its timing and first mover advantage (and not to R&D, patenting, scrapping, or capital
composition16, which do not appear in the PL articles but are of course also fascinating
subjects on their own) and to multinationals in severe international competition.
Roediger-Schluga (2003) has conducted several rounds of interviews in 1999 with heads
of R&D divisions of 28 firms of Austrian manufacturers of printing inks, paints, coatings,
and adhesives (SITC 5332, 5334, 59227, 59229) who were confronted with product and
process standards for VOCs (Volatile Organic Compounds) in 1996.17 These firm spend
on average 50% of their R&D budgets for compliance with these standards. Single
establishment firms spent a higher share on compliance R&D. There is no deterioration
of competitiveness: Small firms report to have been negatively affected, but large firms
report to have benefited. This clearly points to innovation offsets. Firms report to
have adapted their product range and fifteen out of 26 had obtained fresh ideas for
new products. Displacements of other R&D decline with firm size. The progress of
Roediger-Schluga’s contribution compared to that of PL, who cautiously talk of ‘some
cases’, besides adding new cases is that he has a well defined sample and always tells
exactly how many case do or do not correspond to the Porter hypothesis. The small
firms for which he finds no support of the Porter hypothesis are neither those whom
you expect to have much managerial inefficiency as emphasized by PL, the agency cost
interpretation or the X-inefficiency interpretation, nor are they expected to be involved
16Capital composition is discussed in Xepapadeas, A., and A. de Zeeuw (1999) and in Feichtinger
et al. (2005)Feichtinger, Hartl, Kort and Veliov (2005). Note in particular that additional R&D
and patenting through regulation are additional costs as suggested by the neoclassical static first
principles, which still need to be transformed into profits, productivity etc. Therefore they should
not be interpreted as support for the Porter hypothesis unless they lead to higher profits as in some
of the two-stage Cournot models.
17 Interpretation of his calculations of Revealed Comparative Advantage indices give no clear results
because they suffer from the EU accession in 1995 with its trade diversion and creation effects and
the recession in 1998 in connection with the Austrian budget deficit reductions. For a discussion of
early papers using cost function estimates and the associated problems, see Smith and Walsh (2000).
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in strategic competition as emphasized by industrial organization literature to which our
model belongs.
4.3 Distance functions cum regression
It is almost inherent to the distance function approach that the method detects ineffi-
ciencies of some degree because by construct the efficiency has an upper bound of unity,
D ≤ 1, and no disturbances may bring it to a higher value.
Boyd et al. (2002) use distance functions and Malmquist-Luenberger indices for the
NOx emissions and the productivity of the US container glass industry. They show that
almost half of all plants have inefficiencies in regard to productivity and the environment,
as suggested by the Porter hypothesis. Nevertheless, tougher regulations would address
all plants and therefore would be costly. Inefficiencies of more than 10% are not observed
frequently. The overall impression is that this industry is partly very efficient but not
throughout so. The paper does not give the impression that strategic issues are relevant
here. Therefore it contains ‘some cases’ but is not dominated by offsets.
Murty and Kumar (2001) use the distance function approach for 92 water-polluting
firms. Regressing the efficiency measure on a measure of regulation intensity and other
variables they find that regulation enhances efficiency. Efficiencies are indeed low ranging
from a maximum efficiency of .62 to a minimum of .086. One does not need strategic
issues here to guess that almost any reasonable change can only improve the efficiency.
Kumar and Rao (2003) regress inefficiency results according the distance-function
approach on regulation measures and other variables for 33 Indian thermal power plants,
half of which has efficiency at or below .5. Environmental standards significantly increase
inefficiency, contrary to what the Porter hypothesis says. As inefficiency is large one
might have expected the opposite. The Porter hypothesis obviously does not apply here.
However, the authors conclude that this is due to insufficiently strict standards implying
insufficient pressure.
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Managi (2004) investigates the impact of environmental regulation on Luenberger
productivity indices of US agricultural output and distinguishes between all output and
environmental output. He finds evidence in regard to the environmental output but not
for all output. As agriculture is not characterized by problems of attracting managerial
time, attention and information emphasized by PL and is not in the typical international
strategic competition of the PL examples and our model this is hardly surprising. Managi
et al. (2005) find the same result applying the same method to 406 fields in the oil
and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico, which is responsible for 24% of US production.
Obviously, 406 fields are unlikely to play the games typically formulated in the industrial
organization literature and our model. Moreover, gas and oil plants are well known to
be so highly mechanized that they are unlikely to give rise to the X-efficiency or agency
problems, which are typical of long hierarchies and comprehensive bureaucracies of large
firms and therefore other reasons for the inefficiencies found by the distance function
need to be found. Unfortunately the authors do not give us the results of the efficiency
measures but rather report fairly conventional TFP growth results. Again, in a simple
yes/no type of question this might seem to be an anti-Porter result, but with some
eye on the more sophisticated arguments of PL one easily sees that these are not the
cases where one should expect unused innovation offsets through managerial slackness
or strategic advantages.
Marklund (2003) applies the distance function approach to 12 plants of the Swedish
pulp industry. The technical efficiency scores are regressed on an environmental regula-
tion index. The result is a negative but insignificant effect. This means that there are
neither cost increases as predicted by conventional theory nor innovation offsets to an
extent leading to positive profits, but still they reach zero. The existence of 12 plants
may guarantee enough competition to be sure that the imperfect competition models
are irrelevant for them, provided decisions are made at the plant level. The causes of the
technical inefficiencies estimated using distance functions are not analyzed in the paper.
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In regard to the debate about the X-inefficiency of firms it is remarkable that all
studies find some inefficiencies18 but only in the two Indian cases are they large and in
one of these do we get strong offsets. ‘Some cases’ as formulated by PL can be found
in the papers by Boyd, Murty/Kumar, and Marklund. US agriculture and gas and oil
(Managi) as well as Indian thermal power (Kumar/Rao) are not examples of sectors
where one can find any support for PL.
4.4 Other regression analyses
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) state explicitly that they do not want to test the Porter hy-
pothesis. They find that the lagged compliance cost variable has a significantly positive
impact on R&D expenditures but an insignificantly negative impact on patenting. They
interpret the overall result as inconclusive in regard to the Porter hypothesis. We would
like to add though that R&D expenditures are costs and not offsets although they bare
the potential for offsets in the future. But this is exactly not captured by the approach
applied here. For low pay back times this should be possible but not for diffusion pro-
cesses that take decennia.
Albrecht (1998a,b) regresses the change of bilateral exports of refrigerators for house-
holds (SITC 7752) and industry (7414) and air conditioning (7415) from 1989 (one year
after the detection of the ozone problem) to 1995 (one year before the phasing out of
CFCs) on several variables including a dummy for the early adoption of policies against
the use of CFCs. For both refrigerator groups these dummies have clearly positive effects
and provide strong evidence for the Porter hypothesis.
Berman and Bui (2001) find that petroleum refineries at the US South coast had pro-
ductivity gains of about 5% compared to other areas with less environmental regulation
in a panel analysis with fixed effects. They attribute the corresponding non-adoption of
18 To the extent that these inefficiencies reflect different technologies, the question is why technologies
are different. Are there reasons for differences in timing of adoption with the limiting case of never
adopting?
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these other areas to uncertainty about cost and efficacy of new technologies and future
environmental regulation, which corresponds to ‘managerial information’ in the words
of PL.
Lanoie et al. (2001) make an explicit distinction — in a regression of total factor
productivity of 17 manufacturing industry sectors for the years 1985–1994 — between
short and long run effects by using four lags of the regressor ‘investment in pollution
abatement equipment’. They find that the Porter hypothesis holds for the less polluting
industries and for those, which are more exposed to foreign competition. The effects
are negative for the contemporaneous investments and for those lagged by one-year but
positive for the second through fourth lag, with later, positive effects dominating the
earlier negative ones. For the more polluting industries and those less exposed to foreign
competition there are only insignificant results. Other papers do not have so much
emphasis on the distinction between short- and long-run effects.
Alpay et al. provide Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimates of a
translog version of a restricted short-run profit function for the food manufacturing
sector of Mexico and the USA. Using these estimates they can show that in Mexico
profits are decreased through environmental regulation, but productivity is enhanced.
The authors speak of a ’strongly confirmed Porter hypothesis’. For the USA, however,
they find that effects on both, profits and productivity are negligibly small.
Wossink and Wefering (2003) regress income of Dutch farmers on the phosphate reg-
ulation standards and find that less tough standards lead to higher income. Of course,
in Dutch agriculture one would neither expect imperfect competition nor X-inefficiency,
given Holland’s legendary thriftiness.
Isaksson (2005) finds positive but low costs for NOX abatement of 114 plants of three
Swedish industries. As the Swedish Environmental protection Agency is told to have
had low monitoring cost the same is likely to hold for the management. Moreover, plants
are reported to be small and competitive. By implication there seem to be neither large
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Table 5: Effects of environmental regulation on firm, plant, or sector performance
Level Authors Effect on sign
Dow Chemicals Ayres 1994 Profits +
Austrian VOC stan-
dard
Roediger-Schluga 2003 product innovation
(oth.)
+
US conainer glass Boyd et al. 2002 productivity, environ. ±
US agric. Managi 2004 productivity output -
US agric. Managi 2004 productivity environ.
output
+
US oil & gas Managi et. al 2005 productivity output -
US oil & gas Managi et. al 2005 productivity env. out-
put
+
Indian water pollution Murty & Kumar 2001 production efficiency +
Indian Thermal power Kumar & Rao 2003 production efficiency -
Swedish pulp Marklund 2003 production efficiency +
US manufacturing Jaffe & Palmer 1997 R& D +
US manufacturing Jaffe & Palmer 1997 patents ±
Fridge CFC use Albrecht 1998a, b export change +
US Petrol refinery Berman & Bui 2001 productivity +
Quebec manufactur-
ing
Lanoie et al. 2001 productivity +
Mexican food Alpay et al. 2002 productivity (profits) + (-)
US food Alpay et al. 2002 productivity (profits) ± (±)
Dutch agro Wossing & Weferink 2003 family income -
NOx Swed. Industry Isaksson 2005 cost of abatement +
SO2 abatement de Vries & Withagen 2005 patenting abatem.
technology
+
Notes: + denotes an increase, - a decrease of the effect, whereas ± denotes an unclear or
insignificant result.
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management imperfections nor strategic, imperfect competition issues. These plants
seem to come close to the no-imperfection benchmark of the first-principles textbook
and the anti-Porter views.
In de Vries and Withagen (2005) panel data estimates for 14 countries show that sulfur
emissions have a positive impact on patenting of abatement technologies.
In the latter group of studies those dealing more explicitly with dynamics provide
more support for the Porter hypothesis than the other approaches. Three studies on
Dutch and US agriculture and Swedish industries have clear anti-Porter results. Five
others provide support and one is neutral.
Summarizing, Ayres (1994) and Roediger-Schluga (2003) use firm level case studies
as Porter and van der Linde do and find indeed ’some cases’ as claimed by PL that
have increases in competitiveness as perceived by firms. As PL had made a claim only
on ’some cases’ it should be clear that indeed they themselves found some cases for
enhanced profitability, Roediger-Schluga (2003) found some cases of enhanced perceived
competitiveness. Berman and Bui (2001) and Alpay et al. (2002) found cases of enhanced
productivity. Albrecht (1998) found cases of changes in exports, Lanoie et al. (2001)
cases of changes in productivity, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) positive impacts on R&D
and de Vries and Withagen (2005) positive impacts on patenting. Some sectors, which
seemingly have either no inefficiencies or no strategic power give no support for the
Porter hypothesis: Dutch agriculture (Wossink/ Weferink), US agriculture and gas and
oil (Managi), Indian thermal power (Kumar/Rao) and Swedish industry.
Anti-Porter results are either related (i) to small firms in terms of low numbers of em-
ployees and the absence of both, management problems as well as international strategic
competition emphasized by the industrial organization literature, or (ii) to short-run
methods (Alpay et al.), or (iii) to command- and-control methods in environmental
policies (Kumar/Rao). Pro-Porter results are obtained in cases where there is no pre-
sumption against X-inefficiency, agency costs and managerial slackness or information
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problems, typically in large firms with large bureaucracies, or against has a crucial im-
pact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour, which again is only the case when
market power is present and therefore is empirically more likely to be observed for large
firms.
In short, we find that the evidence, in our interpretation, is not contradicting the
theory. When the investigated sample consists of many plants or firms in narrowly
defined sectors imperfect competition is absent and so are strategic issues. If samples
consist of small firms, X-inefficiency is unlikely to occur. In these two cases one cannot
expect the Porter hypothesis to hold. In other samples this is different. Cases supporting
the Porter hypothesis can be found in samples where the properties of (large) firms
with strategic behaviour or X-inefficiency, agency costs and managerial slackness or
information problems can not be rejected a priori. But it also raises a new question: if
the managerial time, alertness and information are redirect by environmental regulation,
where are they distracted from and at what costs? The methods used in the literature
discussed above seems not to be particularly designed for this type of questions and
others may be required. An alternative explanation that papers bring to the fore is
that emphasis on environmental regulation leads firms to search for new combinations
of inputs, which had been found because of the pressure from environmental regulation.
These ideas point more to imperfect technical information and local learning in the
neighbourhood of environmentally relevant aspects of technologies.
In regard to our theoretical result, that a tax turns a preemption game into a pre-
commitment game and provides an international advantage, PL (1995a, 104/5) have
three supporting case studies fromGermany, Scandinavia and the United States. Roediger-
Schluga (2003) has a data set from Austria discussed above in which the large firms are
exposed to and gain in foreign competition in their own perception. Albrecht (1998a,b)
found that firms in countries with early policy adoption have higher export changes for
household and industry refrigerators. Lanoie et al. (2001) find that exposition to more
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foreign rather than domestic competition is more favourable for the Porter hypothesis.
This provides some support but also leaves room for more empirical research empha-
sizing international competition and intertemporal aspects explicitly. Testing our own
results will be difficult because the argument of Smith and Walsh (2000) that the coun-
terfactual will always be missing applies all the more to the preemption game where a
firm wins (looses) with 50% chance ex-ante, but ex-post the probabilities are zero after
having lost and unity after having won. The ex-ante probabilities will never be known
and neither will the transition to the ex-post probabilities. Also we are not aware of
empirical methods for testing for the presence of a preemption game.
Given the many combinations obtained from the properties of small/large firms, ef-
ficient/inefficient, good/bad regulation modes, short run versus dynamic analysis, the
number of cases analyzed is still low so far, but theory and evidence of the literature
triggered by PL can be reconciled once one does not over-interpret the Porter hypoth-
esis. For practical policy though this means that one needs a good knowledge of the
properties of the sectors, a good anticipation of its reaction, and a clear idea how much
of a cost increase one is willing to impose for environmental purposes.
5 Conclusion
Given the prominent role of innovation offsets in the Porter Hypothesis we did prefer
to model it using a framework of technology adoption by Fudenberg and Tirole. In the
stationary version of the model non-adoption is an equilibrium outcome although firms
are profit maximizing.
In our dynamic version of the technology adoption model early adoption is more
costly than late adoption. By implication, immediate adoption cannot be expected
and an equilibrium with time periods where a new technology is not adopted by profit
maximizing firms is a rational outcome.
In the national case, under precommitment on the order of adoption, the leader and
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the follower adopt earlier if the environmental tax is larger. Under preemption, the
timing of preemptive adoption will be earlier if the environmental tax is higher. Joint
late adoption takes place earlier under a higher environmental tax.
In the international case, the home country raises a tax but the foreign country does
not. Under precommitment on the order of adoption, if home is the follower it adopts
earlier if the environmental tax is larger, decreasing the time that a foreign firm can reap
the benefits of early adoption. Comparing behavior as follower, foreign adopts slower
than home, because in the foreign country there is no environmental tax by assumption.
If there is a preemption game, a non-adoption tax in one country ensures that the firm
in that country can preempt earlier than the firm in the other country. The home firm
preempts just before the foreign firm would do. The chance of preemption jumps from
50/50 to 100% for the home country if there is an environmental tax. The case of
preemption will exist under a low environmental tax only if the temporary gains of first
adoption are high relative to the temporary losses of second adoption.
If home wins the preemption game with certainty thanks to the environmental tax,
foreign, foreseeing this, limits itself to following. The resulting game then is one of
precommitment.
Under high non-adoption taxes or low temporary gains and losses there is a precom-
mitment for home to be the leader anyway. Ex-post profits of the home firm are lower
under precommitment the larger the tax is. In sum, a tax introduces a reduction in ex-
post profits in a precommitment game (anti-Porter), but also turns a preemption game
into one of precommitment, which yields higher profit (pro-Porter).
The empirical evidence of both sector and case studies can be reconciled with our find-
ings. The original paper by Porter and van der Linde have case studies of international
advantage in adoption settings, but also newer literature from Austria and Germany.
In general, case studies under more imperfect settings and with a clearer adoption type
of production process confirm our theoretical findings. The review of the case studies
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revealed that in several cases innovation offsets can be observed with subsidies. Other
evidence is in support of the hypothesis in sectors with large firms and strategic activity
where firms have X-inefficiency and agency costs such as managerial time, alertness, and
information.
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